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The poem Nego of London, British Library, 
MS Harley 913,
as a satire on medieval disputes concerning philosophy and theology
和田　葉子
WADA Yoko
　 1330年頃、アイルランドで、フランシスコ会の托鉢修道士によって筆写されたと考え
られる大英図書館所蔵の写本Harley 913には、哲学と神学に関する論争の諷刺詩Negoが
収録されている。24行の短い詩ではあるが、13~14世紀のヨーロッパで巻き起こった神
学論争と合わせて読むと、作者が、大学教育の一環として行われていた「討論」の無意味
さを揶揄していることがわかる。また、ドミニコ会との対立関係も背景にあることがう
かがえる。
キーワード：MS Harley 913（写本Harley 913）、Nego、Middle English（中英語）、Latin
（ラテン語）、theology（神学）、philosophy（哲学）、disputation（討論）、
university education（大学教育）
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London, British Library, MS Harley 913, written in about 1330 or a little later1） by a single scribe, 
contains texts in Latin, English and French. The manuscript is a compilation of various genres such as 
satire, parodies, homilies, meditations, riddles and records of the Franciscan order.2） The contents point 
to a highly intellectual compiler--probably, a Franciscan friar. He was not only able to read and write 
in the three current literary languages of his time (Latin, French and English), but was also well-versed 
in a variety of intellectual works ancient and medieval. In addition to works on the Mass and the 
Divine Offi ce, 3） his intellectual interests ranged from De Excidio Trojae Historia composed by a Greek 
priest and rhetorician, Dares Phrygius (c. 2nd to 3rd century A.D.), to Historia adversus Paganos by the 
fi fth-century theologian and historian, Paulus Orosius, to the contemporary work Meditacio de Corpore 
Christi by the Franciscan Archbishop of Canterbury, John Peckham. 
 Yet another work in the same manuscript, a Middle English poem known as Nego (“I deny” in 
Latin)4）, which will be discussed in this paper, indicates his knowledge of the art of disputation as 
taught in medieval universities. Disputations, or obligations in medieval logic, are scholastic 
discussions which used to be an essential part of the university curriculum in the middle ages.5） 
Obligations are exchanges between two people and are so called because in this form of scholastic 
disputation, one party is obligated to respond to a proponent according to a very strict set of rules in 
playing this logical game. In the obligation (Lat. obligatio), the respondent replies affi rmatively or 
negatively to a proposition which is not self-contradictory and is assumed for the sake of argument.6）
 Here is an example of a basic disputation: fi rst, a person called an opponent poses a proposition 
to a respondent and the latter is bound (or obliged) to respond by taking a certain position on the case 
put forward by the opponent throughout the dispute. The goal of the opponent is to trap the respondent 
into a contradiction, whereas the respondent tries to avoid the contradiction by responding to each 
statement proposed by the opponent within the time of the obligation. The respondent’s possible 
 1） Fletcher suggests MS Harley 913 was transcribed from 1338 to 1342 or a little later (Fletcher, “The date”, 306-
10).
 2） Fitzmaurice and Little, Materials, pp. 121- 6 ; Cartlidge, “Festivity”, 49-52.
 3） Patrick O’Neill shows how precisely the author followed the ordinary of the Mass in the parody Missa de 
Potatoribus (“Goliardic and Canonical: Two Treatments of the Mass in Harley 913,” in A Collection of Essays in 
Commemoration of the 60th Anniversary of the Institute of Oriental and Occidental Studies (Kansai University, 
2011), pp. 69-100).
 4） The present title Nego is supplied by Angela Lucas in her edition, Anglo-Irish Poems.
 5） Marenbon, Later Medieval Philosophy, pp. 19-23.
 6） Longeway, “William”, p. 716.
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responses are, typically, concedo (“I concede”), nego (“I deny”) or dubito (“I doubt”). Thus, for 
example:
Opponent: I pose to you “Every woman jogs.”
Respondent: I admit and I concede “Every woman jogs.”
Opponent: I propose to you “A certain woman does not jog.”
Respondent: I deny “A certain woman does not jog.”
Opponent: I propose to you “A certain woman jogs.”
Respondent: I concede “A certain woman jogs.”
Opponent: I propose to you “Every woman jogs.”
Respondent: I concede “Every woman jogs.”
Opponent: Let the time of obligation stop!
 In the poem Nego, the Latin responses often found in disputations appear, such as dubito and 
concedo as well as nego. Here is the whole text, 7） comprising 24 lines (italics are mine):
⑴ Hit nis bot trewth i-wend an afte,o   perverted
Forte sette ‘nego’ in eni crafte.o   learning
Trewth so draweth to heuen blisse,
‘Nego’ doth noght so i-wisse.o   certainly
‘Forsake’ and ‘saue’ is thefo in lore,o   evildoer teaching
‘Nego’ is pouer clerk in store.o   in reserve
⑵ Whan menne horlith° ham here and thare,o  stagger  this way and that
‘Nego’ sauith ham fram care.o   anxiety
Awei with ‘Nego’ vte of place,o   inappropriately used
Whose wol haue Goddis grace.
Who so wol a-yens the deuil fi ghte
Ther mai ‘nego’ sit arighte.o    properly
 7） The text has been edited by the present writer.
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⑶ Ak loke that we neuer more
‘Nego’ sette in trewe lore,
For who so cano lite hath sone ido,o   knows  has soon fi nished
Anone he draweth to ‘nego’.
Now oo clerk seiith ‘Nego’,    one
And that other ‘Dubito’,
⑷ Seiith an other ‘Concedo’,
And an other ‘Obligo’,
‘Verum Falsum’ sette ther-to
Than is al the lore ido.o    complete
Thus the fals clerkes of har heuido   off the top of their head
Makith men trewth of ham be reuid.o    make men be deprived of the truth
The fi rst stanza begins with a statement: “To give a place to nego in any learning is to turn truth 
backwards. Truth draws people to heavenly bliss, whereas nego does not.” Then the author says in the 
sixth line: “Nego is a poor clerk in reserve”, in other words, the word is kept in reserve to be used only 
whenever necessary; or the word stands for a clerk of low intelligence; or the word is for a poverty-
stricken clerk, since there was no money in studying logic in the middle ages. In the second stanza the 
author explains when the word is useful: “When people stagger here and there, nego saves them from 
anxiety”, that is, when people do not know how to respond in a disputation or when their faith is 
shaken, they use the word nego to escape from their predicament. The poet continues, “Away with nego, 
take it out of the way, whoever wants to have God’s grace.” He then sharply notes that it is appropriate 
to apply nego only when one fi ghts against the devil. In the third stanza the author gives a warning: 
“Beware of giving nego a place in true teaching anymore, because he who knows little and resorts to 
nego is immediately done for.” The fi nal lines of this stanza (lines 17 to 18) and the opening two lines 
of the last stanza, recall the terminology of disputations: “Now one scholar says nego (“I deny”) and 
another dubito (“I doubt”); another says concedo (“I grant”) and another obligo (“I oblige”).
 Thus, it is clear that this is a poem meant to criticize scholastic disputations.8） The word nego 
 8） See, for example, Lucas, Anglo-Irish Poems, p. 213.
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which is mentioned so often in so few lines seems to hold the key to understanding the poem. Nego 
appears no less than nine times, as has just been shown above. The author maintains that scholars 
should not use that word in obligations; otherwise, truth will slip away and they can not obtain God’s 
grace. He also notes that nego saves from worries poor scholars who are not confi dent in disputations. 
The reason why poor scholars are tempted to resort to nego might be found in an account of an 
obligations disputation by William of Sherwood (1200/ 5 ‒1266/71). Unlike William Ockham, 
Sherwood is not very well known now, but he once enjoyed a reputation so high that Roger Bacon 
praised him as a fi ner logician than Albertus Magnus.9） Sherwood wrote a commentary (now lost) on 
the Sentences of Peter Lombard and another on Theological Distinctions. His Introductiones in 
Logicam (c. 1250) is among the earliest discussions of obligations now available. Sherwood explains 
the procedure of an obligations disputation: an opponent begins the disputation by putting forward a 
proposition which the respondent obligates himself to defend as true if the proposition is false, or as 
false if the proposition is true, or as of uncertain truth-value.10） In other words, the respondent is obliged 
to deny or doubt the proposition whether it is true or false. Therefore if one has no idea how to respond 
(as in line seven) because one does not know whether the proposition is right or wrong, it is certainly 
much safer to say nego than to give any other response to the proposition. In this way one could evade 
the anxiety of having to properly consider one’ s response (as in line eight).
 Another word used frequently in the poem is “truth”. It is found four times (once in Latin), 
including occurrences in the rhetorically important opening and closing lines. Both lines express the 
author’s deep concern about how “trewth” has been abused by scholars who put their faith in pedantic, 
hairsplitting scholastic disputations. This concern refl ects the fact that in the thirteenth and fourteenth 
centuries obligations were degenerating into disputations for disputation’s sake. There were even such 
outrageous cases of positio (postulation) such as “You grant that Socrates is a donkey” or “Socrates is 
white or you must grant that Socrates is white”. In other words, the opponent “ obligates ” the 
respondent to grant/concede a proposition even if false, as demanded by the term obligo in line 20 of 
the poem. Elenore Stump would explain this state of affairs as follows:
Scholars have commented that, though there are numerous extant treatises on obligations, there 
 9） Longeway, “William”, p. 713.
10） Stump, “William”, 251.
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is apparently no extant record of even a single actual disputation carried out according to the rules 
of obligations treatises. This fact, the basic rules of obligations, and the requirement that the 
respondent’ s original position be false, all strongly suggest that scholastic interest in obligations 
is not focused on dialectical disputation or the strategies for its conduct.... Rather the material of 
these treatises seems to have a much stronger affi nity with scholastic work on consequences or 
insolubilia.11）
Insolubilia or “insolubles” are paradoxes such as “This proposition is false” or “You do not know this 
proposition”. Stump thus observes the strong relationship of scholastic obligations to paradoxes.12） She 
also gives examples of thirteenth and fourteenth-century manuscripts containing treatises on 
obligations paired with treatises on insolubilia. From these examples, she concludes that 
“... the initial interest in obligations was just in the various paradoxes themselves, apart from any 
well-developed, broader philosophical concern, so that it is not impossible that discussion of 
obligations arose at least in part as a result of scholastic interest in fallacies.”13） 
 Thus, in the thirteenth and the early fourteenth centuries when dialectic disputations came to be 
applied to discussions of theology, conservative medieval thinkers saw in this process an irreconcilable 
confl ict between reason and faith.14） Along with the contemporary interest in fallacies, “double truth” 
also became a big issue. A group of professors, particularly those of the faculty of arts at the University 
of Paris, started to direct their attention to Aristotle’s metaphysical, cosmological and ethical writings 
in addition to his logical works which had been part of the university curriculum. These scholars, who 
were called Latin Averroists, were severely criticized on the grounds that Averroes’ doctrines were not 
compatible with Catholic orthodoxy.15） As a fervent follower and commentator of Aristotle’s works, 
Averroes (or Abu Walid Mohammed Ibn Roschd; 1126-1198) had defended in his treatise The 
Incoherence of the Incoherence the right of human reason to investigate issues of theology. Although 
11） Stump, “William”, 252.
12） Stump, “William”, 252-3.
13） Stump, “William”, 253.
14） Kretzmann, The Cambrige History, p. 522.
15） Leaman, Averroes, pp. 169-9.
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he meant that there are two different ways, philosophical and theological, to reach a single truth, his 
work was misunderstood as advocating a theory of “double truth”, that is, something which can be 
true according to reason but may not be so in the realm of religious beliefs, and vice versa.16） As the 
antagonism between the two camps intensifi ed, a zealous Latin Averroist, Siger of Brabant (1235-
1282), attempted to reconcile them by maintaining that when arguments based on natural reason seem 
to be almost irrefutable but faith contradicts them, we must accept many things on faith which human 
reason leads us to deny. Thus, Siger gives preference to the truth of faith even if it confl icts with the 
conclusion of philosophy.17） He considered that faith surpasses all human reason.18） Siger did not use 
the term “double truth”, but his arguments generally implied that the two kinds of truth could co-exist. 
He had hoped to settle the controversy with this explanation, but unfortunately it only added fuel to 
the fi re with the result that many Averroist doctrines were condemned as heresy by Church authorities 
in the thirteenth century.19） An Arabid-Aristotelian concept of “double truth” was one of the doctrines 
condemned at the University of Paris as a heterodox idea in 1270 and 1277.20）
 The author of the poem Nego seems to maintain that if, as Siger argued, “we must accept many 
things on faith which human reason leads us to deny” “when ... faith contradicts them”, then there is 
no merit in scholastic disputations; rather they do harm. Ultimately, what seems to underlie the 
author’s criticism of such disputations is his awareness of the theory of double truth. That is probably 
why the word “trewth” often appears in his short work. He uses the paradoxical term Verum Falsum 
in line 21, which in the context of disputations is interpreted as “True or False”21）, but which for the 
author might have had other meanings: “a true falsehood”, “a false truth”, “the truth is wrong” or “the 
falsehood is true”. These sound self-contradictory but whichever (if any) meaning of this oxymoronic 
expression we accept, its presence imparts a cynical tone to the poem. The Latin collocation refl ects 
16） Kenny, Medieval Philosophy, p. 49; Leaman, Averroes, p. 169.
17） Voegelin, History, pp. 188-9.
18） Kretzmann, The Cambridge History, p. 618.
19） Kretzmann, The Cambridge History, p. 88.
20） Copleston, Medieval Philosophy, p. 102. He comments, “...though the condemnation of 1277 was directed 
principally against Siger and Boethius, it affected, and was meant to affect, some propositions held by Aquinas and 
certain other theologians. It would appear that the intention was to associate the Christian Aristotelianism of 
Aquinas with the heterodox Aristotelianism expounded in the faculty of arts, and so to compass the ruin of both. 
Possibly the hostility of the secular clergy against the regular clergy played some part in the affair. In any case St. 
Thomas had already made it quite clear that he was no Averroist” (p. 106).
21） Turville-Petre interprets verum falsum as “true/false” (Poems, p. 133).
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contemporary philosophers’ belief that there is a truth which is false, that is to say, there are two 
truths/falsehoods, one true and the other false. 
 In lines 21 and 22, the author tells the reader to add “Verum Falsum” to “Nego”, “Dubito”, 
“Concedo” and “Obligo” which are mentioned in the previous lines; “then”, he says, “all the learning 
is complete.” However, it all depends on how one interprets these Latin verbs: “Concedo” means “I 
grant” when applied to the context of philosophical disputations, but in another context it also means 
“I depart from” or “I give up”. In the same way, the verb “obligo” means “I impede” as well as “I 
make [somebody do something] by agreement under certain conditions” in dialectic obligations. Thus 
the passage can be interpreted in multiple ways: “I deny false truth; I doubt false truth; I give up false 
truth; I impede false truth”. Incidentally, a similar approach is found in lines 11-12: “Who so wol 
a-yens the deuil fi ghte / Ther may ‘nego’ sit aright”, where the author suggests a case in which a word 
normally inappropriate to “trewe lore” could be judged suitable, presumably because of the 
opponent’s legendary deceit. 
 It is very curious that ‘“forsake” and “saue”’ in line fi ve appear, not in their Latin equivalent, but 
in English. The reason may have something to do with word-play. The set of verbs ‘“forsake” and 
“saue”’ can be interpreted in two ways: (a) “to reject” (a verb) and “except” (a preposition) respectively, 22） 
where both words (and meanings), if latinized, would be appropriate to dialectic discussion, while also 
conveying the negative denotations of nego; and (b) ‘“to abandon” and “to save”’, where the two words 
have opposite meanings if both are taken as verbs. Since it is impossible to “abandon” and to “save” 
at the same time, these words may signify a type of contradiction just like double truth. Note how in 
line fi ve, ‘Forsake’ and ‘saue’ have as their predicative verb the singular “is (thef in lore)”, indicating 
that they are being treated as a single collocation. 
 To sum up, the author of this Middle English poem may have had in mind the currency of 
dialectic disputations of a kind which introduce nothing but paradoxes and the Arabid-Aristotelian 
ideas of Averroes. He deplores this state of affairs, commenting that those dialecticians who believe 
in double truth not only cannot receive God’s grace (line 10) but also that they trick people with their 
logic and thereby deprive them of the truth (lines 23 to 24). Note how in lines 13-14 the author uses 
the personal pronoun “we” when he issues the warning “loke that we neuer more ‘nego’ sette in trewe 
lore”. Apparently, he himself had studied (and perhaps taught) at an institution of tertiary education 
22） Turville-Petre takes forsak as “deny” and saue “but, on the contrary” (Poems, p. 133).
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where such disputations were conducted. Although short, his poem represents the skillful composition 
of an intellect concerned about contemporary championing of futile scholastic disputations and the 
theory of the double truth.
 As mentioned above, MS Harley 913 contains works relating to the Franciscan order, including 
one by the Franciscan, John Peckam (c. 1230-1292). Peckham got into a dispute in 1270 with the 
renowned Dominican theologian, Thomas Aquinas (c. 1225-1274), over the unity of the substantial form 
in man. Thereafter confl ict between Franciscans and Dominicans theologian, became so intense that the 
two orders adopted diametrically opposing positions on the issue of the proper use of Aristotelian 
natural philosophy. The Franciscans preferred the more traditional sources, such as Augustine, whereas 
the Dominicans, drawing on Aristotle, equated God with the prime mover and fi nal cause. Another 
Franciscan, Duns Scotus (c. 1266-1308), who tended to follow the Augustinian-Franciscan tradition. 
argued (in the words of Marcia L. Colish) that reason needs the assistance of faith in reaching many of 
the conclusions which for St. Thomas are simply rational truths”.23） Perhaps its author was a Franciscan 
friar behind whose composition lay the rivalry between the Franciscan and Dominican orders.24）
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